2025 and the quiet capture of power

Defections, the collapse of the opposition, and a shift toward the centre changed Nigeria’s political landscape in 2025, all without any major public break. Deputy Political Editor RAYMOND MORDI reports:

In 2025, Nigeria’s politics changed quietly, not through big speeches or new laws, but through a slow shift of power to the center. A series of defections, especially around mid-year, helped the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) bring many political leaders to its side. Governors, lawmakers, and party leaders switched parties mainly to keep their influence before the 2027 elections, not because of shared beliefs. By the end of the year, the opposition still existed in name but had lost its real power.

The mechanics of migration:

The defections in 2025 were notable for how large and organised they were, looking more like a planned effort than random events. The APC did not go out of its way to recruit; instead, it accepted those who decided to join. When governors switched parties, lawmakers and officials soon followed.

These defections happened when states were getting more money, not less. In 2025, states had higher oil revenues, a weaker naira, and more non-oil income. Still, this extra money did not solve politicians’ problems. Inflation, bigger wage bills, subsidy costs, and public demands kept governors under pressure. Joining the ruling party was more about getting political protection and easier access to federal help than about fixing budgets. Even with more resources, patience was running out.

Defections, state by state:

The big shift began in Delta State. In late April, Governor Sheriff Oborevwori left the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) for the APC, saying the state needed to align with the centre. Soon after, his predecessor, Ifeanyi Okowa, members of the State Executive Council, and key party leaders also switched. The State House of Assembly followed when Speaker Emomotimi Guwor led over 20 lawmakers to the APC, leaving the PDP with no real presence. Delta set the pattern: once the governor switched, others quickly followed.

Akwa Ibom was next in June. When Governor Umo Eno switched parties, National Assembly members, state lawmakers, and party officials with government ties also changed sides in an organised way. This was less dramatic than in Delta, but it showed the same thing: the APC was attracting whole groups of leaders, not just a few people.

The trend continued in October when Enugu State Governor Peter Mbah joined the APC. People called this a strategic move, not one based on beliefs, but it was important in a region that usually distrusts the ruling party. As expected, lawmakers loyal to him soon followed, making the opposition even weaker.

By mid-year, the same pattern repeated itself in Bayelsa State. The governor’s defection led National Assembly members and state lawmakers to switch parties as well, showing that staying in the opposition at the state level had become risky.

The wave peaked in Rivers State near the end of the year. The legislature moved first, with Speaker Martin Amaewhule and 16 lawmakers joining the APC. A few days later, Governor Siminalayi Fubara also switched after meeting with President Bola Tinubu and party leaders. That this happened in December showed how 2025 was a year of steady, planned weakening of the opposition.

The governors of Taraba and Plateau States also joined this trend. Agbu Kefas from Taraba said he would join the APC, but his official welcome was postponed till early next year after national outrage and security concerns following the abduction of schoolgirls. In Plateau, after months of rumours and denials, Caleb Mutfwang also announced he would join the APC, and it is expected that all state officials will follow him.

Not all defections started with governors. In May, three senators from Kebbi State—Adamu Aliero, Yahaya Abdullahi, and Garba Maidoki—left the PDP for the APC, giving the ruling party more control in the Senate. In other places, smaller but steady defections in state assemblies and the House of Representatives quietly shifted the balance of power, even if they did not make headlines.

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By the end of the year, the APC controlled most state governments and had a strong lead in the National Assembly. The opposition had fewer members and much less influence.

 Power without proclamation:

President Bola Tinubu played a key role in bringing power together, but he relied on careful planning rather than issuing direct orders. He rarely made public demands. Instead, his team used good timing, quiet discussions, and steady party organization. Governors and lawmakers were allowed to decide for themselves, knowing the ruling party welcomed them. This was a patient, behind-the-scenes way of doing politics.

 Opposition in disarray:

Many politicians moving to the APC both revealed and deepened the opposition’s problems. The PDP spent the year blaming itself, and its internal divisions got worse. When its governors left, it marked the end of a long fight over who should lead the National Working Committee. Rival groups supporting Atiku Abubakar and Minister Nyesom Wike made it hard for the party to decide on anything.

Even after Atiku left for the African Democratic Congress (ADC), the PDP did not recover. Plans for a national convention were postponed from August to November due to disagreements. By year’s end, the PDP seemed less like a party ready to govern and more like a group of unhappy factions.

Court involvement made things worse. Many legal actions and counteractions turned courtrooms into arenas for political fights, prolonging the crises rather than resolving them. Legal tactics replaced real efforts to make peace.

The Labour Party (LP) broke down even more dramatically. The excitement of the 2023 ‘Obidient’ movement was hampered by organizational and funding issues. A strong fight between Peter Obi’s supporters and the national leadership under Julius Abure led to separate conventions, court battles, and even physical fights. By November, the party had split, and many lawmakers had left.

This change affected how people felt. Young supporters became more cynical, and instead of organized activism, many just commented on social media. This raised early worries about possible voter apathy before the 2027 elections.

The ADC, seen as a new ideological option, struggled with too much ambition. Efforts to attract a large assemblage of politicians from other parties are yet to materialise because of personal egos and disagreements over strategy. A public argument between 2023 presidential candidate Dumebi Kachikwu and interim leader David Mark showed how fragile the party was. In July, Kachikwu went to court to challenge INEC’s recognition of Mark and Rauf Aregbesola as national chairman and secretary.

By the end of the year, the ADC was still more of an idea than a real competitor.

A nation under strain:

Besides politics, 2025 was a year of growing national distress. Insecurity got much worse, turning from a constant problem into a real emergency. Banditry in the Northwest became common, with frequent mass school kidnappings. In the North-Central, communal violence became more organized and deadly. The Southeast continued to face attacks by unknown gunmen and damaging sit-at-home orders.

Economic hardship made things even harder. Labour unions often threatened nationwide strikes because of the rising cost of living. For many Nigerians, insecurity and financial stress felt the same, creating a constant sense of vulnerability.

In October, the United States labeled Nigeria a Country of Particular Concern for religious freedom, pointing to issues in the Middle Belt. The Nigerian government called this interference, while critics said it was overdue. Either way, it showed that Nigeria’s confidence on the world stage had weakened.

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The pressure peaked in November, when President Tinubu declared a State of National Security Emergency, granting security agencies greater powers. Defence Minister Mohammed Badaru Abubakar resigned soon after and was replaced by former Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Musa. Many saw this as a move to take security more seriously.

 Legislating through consolidation:

With so many defections, the 10th National Assembly worked more efficiently than usual and faced little resistance. It worked closely with the executive branch. Major laws, like the broad Tax Reform Act signed in September, passed easily. Work also started on constitutional changes for state policing and fiscal federalism, though progress was slow.

Still, controversy continued. In July, Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan accused Senate President Godswill Akpabio of sexual harassment. Instead of starting an independent investigation, the Senate suspended her for misconduct. This decision was widely criticized and raised concerns about legislative accountability.

Rivers State was the most unstable political scene of the year. A feud between Governor Siminalayi Fubara and his predecessor, Nyesom Wike, brought government to a halt and split the legislature. This conflict even led to physical fights.

In October, the Federal Government declared a State of Emergency in Rivers and appointed an administrator. Supporters said this stopped chaos in an important state, but critics called it too much. Even legal experts who usually support the government questioned if the move met constitutional rules, warning that it showed how flexible center-state relations had become.

Signals toward 2027:

The November Anambra governorship election was a rare bright spot for institutions. Governor Chukwuma Charles Soludo of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) won by a large margin, in an election widely seen as fair and peaceful.

INEC also changed leaders. In August, Prof. Joash Ojo Amupitan replaced Mahmood Yakubu as chairman and oversaw by-elections in 15 states, which further strengthened the APC’s position.

The passing of an era:

The death of former President Muhammadu Buhari in July, along with the passing of leaders like Ayo Adebanjo, Edwin Clark, and Mohammed Uwais, marked the end of a generation that once shaped Nigeria’s political values. Their absence left a gap in a political culture now more focused on deals and transactions.

 Conclusion:

Looking back, 2025 was not a year of sudden change, but of steady consolidation. Power quietly moved to the centre. The opposition got weaker. Institutions adjusted but did not fall apart. The big shift was never officially announced; it just happened. As Nigeria moved toward 2027, the real question was not who held power, but whether there was enough room to challenge it.